Skill Transferability, Regret and Mobility by Borghans, L. & Golsteyn, B.H.H.
  
 
Skill Transferability, Regret and Mobility
Citation for published version (APA):
Borghans, L., & Golsteyn, B. H. H. (2006). Skill Transferability, Regret and Mobility. (Discussion paper;
No. 2021). Bonn: IZA.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2006
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
aa
st
ric
ht
] A
t: 
10
:5
7 
25
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
Applied Economics, 2007, 39, 1663–1677
Skill transferability, regret
and mobility
Lex Borghans and Bart H. H. Golsteyn*
Department of Economics and ROA, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616,
6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
After graduation many students start working in sectors not related to
their field of study or participate in training targeted at work in other
sectors. In this article, we look at mobility immediately after graduation
from the perspective that educational choices have been made when these
pupils had little experience of the actual working life in these professions.
We develop a model where students accumulate partially transferable
human capital but also learn about their professional preferences at the
university and during the first years in the labour market. As a
consequence of this newly acquired insight, these young workers might
realize that working in another occupational field would better fit their
preferences, although they are better equipped to work in their own field.
The empirical analysis reveals that if wages are 1% lower due to lower skill
transferability, the probability that a graduate who regrets his choice
actually switches decreases by 1.4 percentage points, while those who
switch on average take 0.3 months additional education.
I. Introduction
Human capital investments are typically made in a
context of large uncertainty, since students choose
their education before they have any serious experi-
ence of working in a related field. Among others,
Freeman (1975), Siow (1984) and Zarkin (1985) have
analysed uncertainty with respect to market wages
related to educational choices. As noted by Weiss
(1971), the individual will face an even larger
uncertainty regarding his individual preferences for
possible occupations. Consequently, many graduates
entering the labour market discover that the occupa-
tional field they have chosen does not suit them. The
consequences of this uncertainty on further invest-
ments in human capital have remained unexplored.
The aim of this article is to analyse the effect of
ex ante uncertainty on ex post human capital
investment decisions. In our model in Section II,
students improve their insight about their occupa-
tional preferences and labour market prospects during
the years they spend in education and during the time
they enter the labour market. After graduation, they
can choose whether and how intensely they will
continue studying. At the same time, these graduates
evaluate their choice of occupational field. Those who
discover that another field better fits their personal
preferences, and thus regret their initial choice, have
an incentive to switch to this different field.
The key insight of the model is that the probability
of graduates regretting their choice switching from
one field of education to another will increase when
their education provides them with skills that can
easily be transferred to other disciplines. If skill
transferability is relatively high, these graduates are
expected to be able to switch fields with only modest
additional investments in human capital and without
large losses in wages due to under-utilization of their
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human capital. When graduates who can less easily
transfer their skills switch, it can be expected that
larger investments in additional human capital are
needed and that larger wage drops will be
experienced.
Section III describes the data with which we
evaluate the empirical support for the model: a
sample of 2675 Dutch graduates from higher educa-
tion, approached 3 years after graduation. A gradu-
ate is defined as a switcher when the field in which he
continued his education differs from his original field
and/or if the graduate indicates that his occupation
does not match his education. A total of 29.5% of the
graduates switch. To measure regret, we make use of
a survey question covering exactly our theoretical
concept of regret. We ask the graduates: ‘Looking
back, if you were free to choose again, would you
choose the same study programme?’ Approximately
17% of the graduates report that they regret their
choice.
In Section IV, we explain our empirical strategy.
We estimate equations for the probability that a
student switches after graduation, the loss of income
if he switches and the additional training taken by
those who switch. We use the fact that graduates who
continue to study reveal latent information about the
skill transferability of their original education. To
measure differences in transferability, we therefore
add separate dummies for 18 educational fields to
each of the equations, mentioned above. In the
second step we test the predictions of our model by
comparing the estimates of the transferability
parameters from these equations.
Consistent with the model, the empirical analysis in
Section V shows that conditional on regret, a high
skill transferability increases the probability of
switching from one field to another and that if
graduates switch, they participate longer in education
when transferability is lower. Furthermore, for those
who change fields, wage losses are larger when
transferability is lower. Hence, the results show that
regret inflicts damage on a graduate’s human capital
and that this damage is reduced if skill transferability
is higher. Concerning the magnitude of the damage,
the results indicate that if wages are 1% lower due to
lower skill transferability, the probability that a
graduate who regrets his choice actually switches
decreases by 1.4 percentage points, while those who
do switch take on average 0.3 months additional
education.
Next to the contribution to the literature about
uncertainty in educational choices, our analysis gives
new insights into other areas. Our article is related
to the literature about the transition from school to
work. Mu¨ller and Shavit (1998) and Ryan (2001),
among others, analyse the labour market entrance of
young workers, characterized by high rates of job
turnover, high rates of unemployment and discre-
pancies between job requirements and skills acquired
at school, from the perspective of the gap between
college and work these graduates must bridge. In this
article, we analyse the same transition period from
the perspective that a pupil’s image of working life
differs from reality. From this perspective, educa-
tional choice is the crucial step, while only the
consequences of earlier ‘mistakes’ are revealed
during the transition from school to work.
Furthermore, our analysis contributes to the
literature about training, since it adds repairing initial
educational choices as a cause for training to the well-
known arguments such as education-training com-
plementarity (Heckman, 2000; Brunello, 2004) and
depreciation of human capital (Ben-Porath, 1967;
Rosen, 1976). This literature on human capital
formation is generally concerned with choices of
education levels. In our analysis, we instead focus on
the choice of a discipline.
The literature on educational mismatch focuses on
the returns to schooling of graduates with a higher
level of education than the level needed in their jobs.
Sloane et al. (1999) and Dolton and Vignoles (2000),
among others, show that although surplus education
gives some positive return, overeducated workers
earn less than adequately educated workers with a
similar schooling. Groot (1996) shows that over-
educated workers earn less and undereducated work-
ers earn more than correctly allocated workers.
Controlling for measurement error, Robst (1994)
finds there to be no returns to excess schooling.
McGuinness (2003) shows that wage gaps would still
occur even if workers were perfectly matched to jobs
due to disproportionate returns associated with the
successful attainment of certain categories of jobs.
Bu¨chel and Mertens (2004) find that overeducation
leads to lower relative wage growth. Hersch (1991)
finds that overqualified workers are more likely to
quit, are less satisfied with their jobs and take less
training. Defining mismatch as a difference between
the field of study required and actual field of study
from which the individual has graduated, Heijke et al.
(2003) find that graduates with more generic compe-
tencies are more likely to be mismatched and involved
in training. The characteristic feature of these
mismatch models is that workers are randomly
assigned to jobs (Jovanovic, 1979; Sauer, 1998).
This random assignment produces a mismatch
because some workers lack the appropriate skills.
While this is an effective assumption when investigat-
ing how workers are affected by a mismatch, this
theory does not give any insight into the reasons for
1664 L. Borghans and B. H. H. Golsteyn
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the mismatch. In our model, graduates decide
whether they leave their initial education. Because
our model is more explicit about the nature of the
mismatch, it provides an important complement to
the mismatch theory.
Our idea is linked with the literature on
occupational mobility. However, a large part of the
literature on occupational mobility assumes that
workers can practically change jobs as often as they
want and that they even use this opportunity to
discover their career preferences. For instance, Miller
(1984) and Neal (1999) find that young workers
choose to switch often to find their optimal career
path. Topel and Ward (1992) show that adjustments
are mainly made by the group of new entrants as a
trial-and-error process, while Sicherman and Galor
(1990) analyse job changes that are an integral part of
workers’ careers. This means that a worker does not
leave because he is mismatched, but because he
intended to leave from the outset. Our analysis
focuses on a switch to an entirely different field of
occupations instead of a switch between two jobs
within a field of occupations. Therefore, in our
analysis, the loss of human capital due to switching
becomes crucial. In some studies on job mobility, the
loss of human capital has been studied more
specifically. Shaw (1984) investigates mobility
between sectors and finds that occupational skills
are only partially transferable with occupational
change. In standard wage equations, occupational
experience therefore far better predicts the wage than
overall experience. We find similar results for
educational skills, which means that human capital
accumulated through education is also field specific
and that some skills are lost when switching from one
field to another. Furthermore, Bils (1985), Neal
(1998), and McLaughlin and Bils (2001) find that
more able workers change jobs less often, because
they have a higher loss of job-specific skills.
II. The Model
Consider a pupil1 who starts to study. In his career,
three periods can be distinguished. The first period
comprises a constant s1 years of full-time education.
At the start of period 1, the pupil decides which field
of education to attend. The educational decision is
based on the maximization of expected utility of the
professions he could practice after studying.2 This
utility is derived from intrinsic (the extent to which he
likes his job) and extrinsic (income) factors. At this
point in time, the student is still uncertain about both
his preferences and the income he can expect. We
assume the intrinsic factors (Ik) to depend on
occupation k and to be constant over time,3 and
annual wage (Yt) to be derived from human capital.
4
Wages Yt ¼ kHtðsÞð1 Þ are a combination of the
amount of knowledge gathered by the student
Ht(s)¼ s (where  (0 <1) reflects the decreasing
marginal revenues of education), the occupation-
specific return (market value) of this knowledge (k)
and the time spent working (1 ). The fraction  of
time not spent working is used for further education
or training. We assume the elasticity of substitution
between intrinsic and extrinsic factors to be unity.
Therefore, people tend to like a profession more if
they can earn a higher wage from it, and vice versa.5
The only costs of education are foregone earnings
and switching between different fields of education is
not possible in period 1. For simplicity, we also
assume the interest rate to be 0 (future earnings are
not discounted) and the wage is independent of work
experience. The utility of the student/worker equals:
U ¼
X
t
IkYt ð1Þ
When the individual graduates, he enters period 2.
The length of period 2 is s2 years. This length is also
assumed to be constant. Unlike the pupil at the
beginning of the first period who was characterized
by uncertainty, due to his study and early labour
market experience, the graduate knows his labour
market position and whether he likes his discipline at
the beginning of period 2. Therefore, the graduate
can evaluate his choice of education and decide
whether to stay in his original discipline (working
and/or studying) or switching to a different one. If the
graduate switches, skills from his initial field of
education can be transferred to the other field of
education. This implies that the amount of knowledge
(H) depends on the skill transferability, k, which is
specific for each field of study. If k¼ 0 switching
involves a total re-start, if k increases, skills become
more transferable. In period 2, the graduate
1We use the term ‘pupil’ to indicate an individual who is in secondary school, ‘student’ to indicate a person who attends
college and ‘graduate’ to indicate that one has successfully finished college.
2 For simplicity, utility can only be derived from working and not from studying.
3We assume that the pupil bases his choice on an estimation of Ik and is not yet aware of the true value of his preferences.
While his perception of his true preferences might change, his true preferences are constant.
4 Individual subscripts are excluded from the model.
5 An additive version of the model ðU ¼Pt Ik þ YtÞ gives similar results.
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can choose the intensity of studying (). After period
2, no more studying is possible and the individual will
work for n years in the profession linked to the
last education taken. A person retires
at T¼ t0þ s1þ s2þ n, where t0 is the age at which
a person starts his education. The effect of human
capital acquired at school is assumed to only become
effective for the wage at the end of each period
(when a diploma is obtained). Figures 1 and 2 show
the behaviour of graduates in time frames when they
remain in their own discipline and switch to
another, respectively.
The individuals utility in a specific period can be
described by:
Ut ¼ ð1 tÞIkkHðstÞ ð2Þ
with t¼ 1 in period 1, t¼  in period 2, and
t¼ 0 in period 3. Let us first consider what
the graduate’s utility will be if he stays in his
educational field k. In this case, skills are
perfectly transferable (k¼ 1), since the individual
has no human capital in period 1 (H(s0)¼ 0)
and since ¼ 1 in period 1 and ¼ 0 in period 3,
and utility thus becomes:
Uk ¼
Xs1
t¼0
0IkkHðs0Þ þ
Xs1þs2
t¼s1
ð1 ÞIkkHðs1Þ
þ
XT
t¼s1þs2
1IkkHðs1 þ s2Þ
¼ s2ð1 ÞIkks1 þ nIkkðs1 þ s2Þ ð3Þ
The first part of function (3) defines the utility
that can be gained in period 2, in which the
individual can earn an income s1 by working
(1 )s2 and the second part is the income he
gets in period 3 as a result of his study efforts in
periods 1 and 2.
The optimum amount the individual can study in
his original discipline in period 2 can then be derived
from the first-order condition for maximizing utility
with respect to :
s2k ¼ n
s1
 1=ð1Þ
s1 ð4Þ
This function shows that the study time in period 2
increases if the (expected) working life is longer. As
opposed to this, if the income to be gained from
period 1 education ðs1Þ increases, study efforts in
period 2 decrease.
Utility from the option to switch to another
discipline j, can be derived analogously to the
above. The difference is that k does not have to be
equal to one:
Uj ¼ ð1 Þs2Ikks1 þ nIjjðks1 þ s2Þ ð5Þ
Equation 5 takes into account that the amount of
human capital decreases if the transferability
decreases. Moreover, utility during working time in
the third period is now dependent on the intrinsic
valuation of the second education.6 Maximizing this
function with respect to  gives:
s2j ¼ Ij
Ik
 
j
k
 
n
s1
  1=ð1Þ
ks1 ð6Þ
Function 6 shows that if the skill transferability
from education k in the first period to education j in
the second period increases, study efforts in the
second period decrease. If the intrinsic value of j is
relatively large as compared to the intrinsic value of
k, the study efforts in j will increase. The reason for
this is that the intrinsic utility from working in k is
lower, which reduces the opportunity costs for
additional education. This is a consequence of the
specification of the utility function where intrinsic
value and money are not fully substitutable. With an
additive utility function, this effect disappears.
By substituting the optimal duration of education in
Uk and Uj, the choice to switch or not can be derived.
Utility in j will be larger than or equal to utility in k if:
Ij
Ik
 
j
k
 
 1þ 
1  ð1 kÞs1
s1
n
 1=ð1Þ !1
ð7Þ
In (7), the combination of the ratios on the left-
hand side gives information about the individuals
difference in ex ante and ex post perception regarding
the disciplines. If the left-hand side is smaller than
Fig. 1. Career path of the graduates who do not switch field
of education
Fig. 2. Career path of the graduates who switch field
of education
6 This is due to our assumption that graduates start working in the latest chosen profession.
1666 L. Borghans and B. H. H. Golsteyn
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unity, ex post information points in the same
direction as ex ante information, namely that educa-
tion k is the best education for the individual. If the
combination of the ratios exceeds unity, however, the
information after graduation points out that in
retrospect, j instead of k would have been the better
educational choice. The graduate then regrets his
initial choice. The difference between ex ante and
ex post utility can either stem from an overestimation
of the labour market perspectives of education k
relative to j, or because the graduate simply under-
estimated how much he liked j relative to k.
Second, the right-hand side of the equation
exceeds unity if  is smaller than unity. If  is
greater than unity, the right-hand side is smaller
than unity. Hence, if the left-hand side is larger
than unity and also larger than the right-hand side,
a graduate who regrets his choice will switch from
k to j. A graduate who does not regret his initial
education will switch if k>1.
7 Hence, conditional
on the amount of regret of a graduate, the skill
transferability of education k determines whether a
graduate will switch.
Before the start of period 1, students must
choose an educational field. At that point in time,
they have no perfect information about their own
preferences. Denoting the expected preferences by
I^j implies that if k were equal for all k, they
would choose k if I^kk > I^jj. However, if k’s
differ between fields of study and students realize
that they face uncertainty regarding their profes-
sional preferences, students close to the break-even
point will tend to choose the field of study with a
higher k. Fields of study with a higher skill
transferability will therefore attract more uncertain
students and the frequency of regret will be higher
in these fields.
III. Data Description and Definitions
The data used in the analysis are taken from the
Dutch 1998 CHEERS survey. In this survey, gradu-
ates from higher vocational education and university
are approached 3 years after their graduation in
1995.8 Since we want to focus our analysis on regular
students, we selected those aged below 35.9 2675
graduates remain. Their average age is 28.7 years,
56% are female, 80.5% are working with an average
wage of 11.1 euros/hour.
The survey is unique for our purposes because it
contains information on the (initial) chosen disci-
pline, the discipline(s) studied in the 3 years after the
initial education, the relation between the graduate’s
job and his education, the duration of the time spent
studying after the original discipline and the level of
regret of the original field of study.
In Table 1, the shares of respondents are reported
by original educational field of study. The initial field
of study is defined by the education finished in 1994/
1995. The disciplines are classified by 2-digit ISCED
codes. As can be seen in the table, only 0.5% had
followed a Life Science education, 0.1%
Manufacturing and processing and 0.4% a
Veterinary education. These groups are excluded
from the analysis. In the analyses, we use Teaching
as the reference group.
After graduation, respondents are able to con-
tinue their studies in the same or another field of
study in the regular educational system or attend
courses. In the survey, they are asked ‘Have you
followed a course/training with the intention of
substantially increasing or broadening your profes-
sional qualifications?’ Therefore, courses and train-
ing for (hobby or other) nonwork related purposes
are not taken into account in the analysis. Both the
disciplines of the regular education and the courses/
training are classified with 2-digit ISCED codes.
A comparison of the discipline chosen after
graduation with the initial field of study, determines
whether the graduate switches from one field to
another. Here, the implicit assumption is that a
switch will be observed when there is a change in
the contents of the education. Since each educa-
tional field is a combination of a number of
detailed educational titles, it is possible that some
individuals move between relatively different educa-
tions in the same field with no change observed,
while others move between relatively similar educa-
tions that fall into different fields and a switch will
be observed. We assume that, on average, graduates
who move across categories experience a larger
change of the contents of their education than
7This may occur if a profession demands skills from different educations. Changing education then becomes a prerequisite for
working in such a profession, not a correction of the original choice. Next to this, switching can also be explained by a
consumption effect when some studies provide much direct utility but do not offer interesting job opportunities. For
simplicity, we assume in our model that utility can merely be derived from an education while working. Extensions including
consumption motives from education do not affect the empirical results.
8 Therefore, the duration of further education is not only truncated at zero but also at 3 years.
9 The results do not change qualitatively when all graduates are included.
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those moving across educations within a field.
A total of 18.7% of the graduates continued their
education in a different field. Besides a move from
one education to another, it is possible that a
graduate switches without additional education. He
might start working in a job not related to his
education and acquire the necessary skills on the
job. Therefore, we extended the definition of
switching by taking into account those graduates
indicating that their job does not require the skills
learned in college. The question asked is to what
extent working people make use of the knowledge
and skills acquired in the education finished in
1994/1995. The answer categories vary from ‘not at
all’ (1) to ‘to a very high extent’ (5). If graduates
were not at all (1) or to a small extent (2) making
use of their skills, we added them to our population
of switchers.10 It can be seen from Table 2 that
14.7% of the working graduates are not working in
a related field. In total, the number of switchers
therefore equals 29.5%. Background information
concerning switching can be found in Table A1.
In Table A2, information is given about the origin
and direction of the switchers. In our analysis, we use
dummies for the education from which the graduate
originates to estimate the transferability parameters.
We do not take into account towards which field the
graduate switches. The average distance is measured
by skill transferability.
The survey asks the length for each training
expressed in months. When respondents participate
in regular education, the exact beginning and ending
dates are asked.11 One year of education is recoded
into 12 months. Since people in general consider their
formal education as more important than their
training and training is often combined with work,
we valued the intensity of training as half the intensity
of regular education by multiplying the duration by
five. Table 3 shows that 30% of the respondents
continued to study after their initial education. About
half the graduates chose to study a different topic
than the original discipline. Moreover, a very small
amount of graduates continued to study both in their
original discipline and in another discipline. In our
analysis, we included these with the graduates who
switched.
Furthermore, in a section with questions on the
field of education from which the person graduated in
1994/95, the respondents are asked: ‘Looking back, if
you were free to choose again, would you choose the
same study programme?’ The answers are scaled from
‘very probable’ (1) to ‘not likely at all’ (5). This
variable is interpreted as the regret one has of
studying in the original discipline.12 Table 4 shows
Table 1. Distribution of respondents over disciplines in
original educationa
Disciplines Percentage
Teacher education and education science 10.8
Arts 3.9
Humanities 4.6
Social and behavioural science 6.5
Journalism and information 2.6
Business and administration 21.0
Law 5.0
Life science 0.5
Physical science 1.9
Mathematics and statistics 0.8
Computing 3.4
Engineering and engineering trades 9.0
Manufacturing and processing 0.1
Architecture and building 3.4
Agriculture and forestry 3.0
Veterinary 0.4
Health 10.8
Social services 7.3
Personal services 3.5
Transport services 0.7
Environmental protection 0.8
Total 100.0
Number of graduates 2675
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
Table 2. Usage of skills acquired by the initial education in
current professiona
Usage of skills in profession Number of graduates
Not working 133
Not at all 34
Very little 340
Sometimes 846
Often 997
All the time 325
Total 2675
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
10 In the robustness analysis, we investigate the effect on the results when switching is defined differently.
11 There is no information available about the intensity of training or education in hours per week.
12 The concept of regret as defined in regret theory (introduced into economic theory by Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982;
Fishburn, 1982) fits closely to our definition. While utility directly depends on the level of regret in regret theory, utility here
only depends on actual consumption and job satisfaction. In regret theory, people therefore try to avoid a situation of regret,
while in our model, people just try to maximize utility.
1668 L. Borghans and B. H. H. Golsteyn
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the level of regret from the original education. Most
respondents are happy with their choice, but about
17% are dissatisfied. Other surveys provided similar
percentages of regret. It can be noted that the number
of respondents changing disciplines increases with an
increase in the level of regret. More information on
the regret variable is given in the appendix. Table A3
shows that graduates with an Environmental
protection or education in Journalism regret their
choice most.
IV. Empirical Strategy
The model shows skill transferability to be related to
(1) the probability of switching (positively), (2) the
duration of education if one switches (negatively) and
(3) the value of acquired human capital in another
field of education (positively). Since skill transfer-
ability cannot be directly observed, we will identify
the model by assuming the transferability of human
capital to vary between fields of study. The empirical
strategy is to estimate each of the three relationships
mentioned earlier, using dummies for fields of study.
This means that we apply a random coefficient
approach where the transfer parameter in each
equation depends on educational dummies plus an
error term. Since the estimated parameters of
these dummies reflect the same theoretical
concept ‘transferability’, this allows us to test the
model by comparing the estimates of the three
equations.
Switching between fields of education
Rewriting (7) yields
s ¼ Ij
Ik
 
j
k
  1=ð1Þ
1 
1  ð1 kÞs1
s1
n
 1=ð1Þ
ð8Þ
where the graduate will switch if and only if s*>0.
Assuming  to be relatively small, Equation 8 can be
linearized and a straightforward expression for the
decision to switch can be obtained. Because the
labour market value of education is essentially
reflected in a diploma and not in years of education
(being a slow student is not a positive asset), we
assume that the value of the initial education within
the same discipline does not depend on duration.
Therefore, n=s1 is rewritten as a constant ().
13 We
assume the relative attractiveness of the alternative
Table 4. Regret of initial education and switching behavioura,b
Level of regret Response Percentage (%) Switch (%) No switch
No regret 732 27.4 21.7 78.3
Little regret 1029 38.5 26.6 73.4
Neutral 452 16.9 32.5 67.5
Regret 314 11.7 37.9 62.1
Strong regret 148 5.5 60.8 39.2
Total 2675 100.0 29.5 70.5
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
Notes: bRegret is measured by the question: looking back, if you were free to choose again, would you choose the
same study programme? Answer categories range from: 1 very probable (no regret) . . . 5 not likely at all (strong
regret).
Table 3. Mean duration of initial and further education and field of further educationa
Response
Initial discipline
(Months)
Other discipline
(Months)
No further education 1783 0.0 0.0
Same field 391 19.8 0.0
Other field 454 0.0 12.7
Same and other field 47 13.5 14.2
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
13Note that this also implies that s1 is a constant.
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j to k to be a linear function of regret as measured in
our survey: ðIj=IkÞðj=kÞ ¼ 0 þ 1regretþ ". The
constants are collected in 0. Because of the binary
nature of the variable s*, we write the function in
logit form. Following from (8), the -parameters have
a positive relation with switching and are conditional
on the level of regret. To identify the transferability
for each educational discipline, we include dummy
variables for the (initial) fields of study
ðeducÞ : i ¼ 0þ
Pk¼18
k¼2 keduck þ ". " is assumed to
have a logistic distribution. As explained earlier, we
include interaction terms in the switching equation,
separately estimating the educational dummies for
graduates with low levels of regret (R0, regret¼ 1
or 2) and graduates with higher levels of regret (R1).
X denotes the control variables gender, age and
age-squared.14
s ¼ 0 þ 1  Xþ 2  regretþ R0
Xk¼18
k¼2
s0k educk
þ R1
Xk¼18
k¼2
s1k educk þ "
Switch ¼ 0, s < 0
Switch ¼ 1, s > 0 ð9Þ
Duration of further education
Using the same assumptions and by linearizing,
Equations 4 and 6 reduce to (10) and (11)
respectively, where Dns equals the study duration
for those who do not switch and Ds the duration for
those who switch, i.e.
Dns ¼  s1 þ " ð10Þ
and
Ds ¼ 0 þ 1regret ks1 þ " ð11Þ
The duration function for those who do not switch
reduces to a constant as shown in Equation 10. The
duration function for switchers also includes the
amount of regret and the transfer parameter k.
To identify the transferability of human capital, we
include dummy variables for the educations. The
constants  and 0 can be integrated with 0 leading
to a new constant c. The duration function for those
who switch then reduces to a linear function of a
constant, the regret variable, dummies for the
disciplines and an error term.
Naturally, there might be other factors influencing
the duration of additional education that differ
between fields of study. To correct the differences in
the transferability parameters for this for the
nonswitchers, we take the deviations of the transfer-
ability parameters in the switchers’ duration function
relative to the parameters in the nonswitchers’
duration function. This is done by estimating a
system where the  parameters, being the correction
for the true  parameters, appear in both duration
functions. We also include the regret variable in the
duration function for those who do not switch to test
if, as in the mathematical model, the duration for
nonswitchers is not affected by this variable. As in
our theoretical model, we truncated the duration
functions at zero. This yields
Ds¼ cþ0Xþ1regretþ
Xk¼18
k¼2
dkeduck
Xk¼18
k¼2
dkeduckþ "
ð12Þ
and
Dns ¼ cþ 0Xþ 1regretþ
Xk¼18
k¼2
keduck þ " ð13Þ
where
DðnÞs > 0! DðnÞs ¼ DðnÞs
DðnÞs < 0! DðnÞs ¼ 0
Wage
Switching from one field to another will lead to a
loss of human capital. The more transferable skills
acquired during the first period of education are, the
less the individual will suffer from this loss of human
capital. Therefore, we estimate a wage equation that
includes dummies for each field of study and an
interaction term for each field that equals 1 only
when the graduate has switched. The corresponding
parameters reflect the relationship between transfer-
ability and wage, conditional on switching fields of
study. In addition to the usual control variables, we
include tenure. Furthermore, we included the regret
variable to check whether it has an impact on the
wage. We separated this variable for those who do
not switch, S0, and those who switch, S1 (dummy
variables). The wage function can then be written as:
logðwageÞ ¼ 	0 þ 	1Xþ 	2tenureþ 	3S0regret
þ 	4S1regretþ
Xk¼18
k¼2
	keduck
þ
Xk¼18
k¼1
wk ðeduckswitchÞ þ " ð14Þ
14 The results are similar if the transferability parameters are not conditional on regret.
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In our model, the wage consists of the product
of human capital (H) and the value of human
capital (). Limited transferability of skills will
diminish the amount of human capital.
However, we measure the wage rather than
the amount of human capital. Regret can be related
to discrepancies between image and reality of
both the intrinsic valuation and the market value of
human capital in a certain field. As far as people
switch field because of changes in market value,
transfer losses of changing occupations will be
underestimated when using a wage equation. Only
when intrinsic motives are the main determinant of
occupational mobility immediately after graduation,
these wage effects will be an adequate measure of
transferability. Since the data of the survey reveal
that mobility is to a large extent driven by intrinsic
aspects, we expect the wage effects to reveal the
transferability of skills.
The second step: identifying transferability
We expect to find that the transferability-parameters
of the switch Equation 9, the duration Equation 12
and the wage Equation 14 are all determined by the
same underlying skill transferability. Allowing for
scale differences and some measurement error, this
means that dk ¼ 
d0þ 
d1k þ "d, s0k ¼ 
s00 þ 
s01 k þ "s0 ,
s1k ¼ 
s10 þ 
s11 k þ "s1 and wk ¼ 
w0 þ 
w1 k þ "w. As a
consequence, all four estimated transferability dum-
mies must be positively related. This implies that
transferability has a negative coefficient in the
duration equation and a positive one in the switch
equation and that our assumption holds that the loss
of human capital increases, conditional on a switch,
when transferability is low. To test this, we first
compute the separate equations. From each equation,
we find 17 transferability parameters (one for each
field of study except the reference category). The
relation between these parameters is tested by
weighted least squares. We weigh by the number of
graduates per educational discipline to take into
account the heteroscedasticity of these estimates.
Hence,
s0 ¼ 0 þ 1d þ " ð15Þ
s1 ¼  1 þ  1d þ " ð16Þ
d ¼ 0 þ 1w þ " ð17Þ
s0 ¼ !0 þ !1w þ " ð18Þ
s1 ¼ 0 þ 1w þ " ð19Þ
s0 ¼ 0 þ 1s1 þ " ð20Þ
To be consistent with the theoretical model, 1,  1,
1, !1, 1 and 1 must be positive. Since the estimates
of the transfer parameter all contain measurement
error this test of the consistency of the model does not
provide any unbiased estimates of the relationship
between the probability to switch (for those who
regret their choice and those who do not regret their
choice), the duration of additional education and
wage losses. All four estimates provide a measure of
transferability without any a priori scale. Since it is
interesting to get an indication about the size of these
effects, we also estimate the equations, each linking
two measures of transferability, using a third measure
as an instrument. Assuming the measurement errors
to be uncorrelated, this provides unbiased estimates
of the parameters.
V. Results
The estimation results are shown in Table A4. The
first column reports the estimation results from the
switching equation. These results reveal a significant
relationship between regret and the decision to switch
to another field after graduation. Compared to
Teachers, there are fields of study for which the
probability to switch is significantly lower conditional
on regret, but there are also fields of study with a
significantly higher probability to switch. Since we
measure the relative impact of transferability on the
probability to switch, this measure can only be
ordinally interpreted, so that 0 and 1 have no specific
meaning.
In the second and third column, the parameter
estimates of the time graduates spent on further
education are presented. Here, regret has no sig-
nificant effect on the duration of education. In the
model, this relationship resulted from the comple-
mentarity between the intrinsic and the extrinsic value
of a job. As a result for graduates who like a certain
job less, the utility loss of forgone income in this job
is also lower. The estimation results indicate that such
interaction does not exist or is at least not strong
enough to be significant. In the fourth column, we
report the estimates of the wage function. Tenure and
age have the usual impact on wage and men earn
more than women.
From the perspective of our model, it is not only
crucial that regret induces switching, but also that
skill transferability determines whether graduates
regretting their choice actually change fields and,
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when they switch, how much human capital they lose
and how much education they take to compensate for
this loss. Since we use educational dummies as
proxies for skill transferability, this implies that the
relative size of these dummies has to be consistent
between the different equations. In a second step, we
test the relationship between these dummies by
weighted (by the number of graduates per educa-
tional discipline) least squares regressions to take the
heteroscedasticity of the estimations into account.
Table 5 shows that the relation between the transfer-
ability parameters in the equations can be confirmed.
Therefore, the data are consistent with the assump-
tion that people lose human capital when they switch
and that skill transferability has both a positive effect
on switching and a negative effect on the investment
in education for those who switch.
In theory, the coefficients in Table 5 also provide
information about the relative size of the effect
distinguished in the model. The coefficients are
biased, however, due to the fact that both the
explanatory and the dependent variable contain
measurement error. To correct for this, we use
IV-estimators. Assuming the error terms in each set
of dummies to be independent from other sets, for
each equation we use the other sets to instrument for
this measurement error. Taking a linear approxima-
tion of the logistic switching function at the average
of 0.25 for those who do not regret their choice and
0.39 for those who regret, we find that when
graduates who switch take one additional month of
training due to lower skill transferability, the prob-
ability of switching is 0.6% lower for those who do
not regret their choice and 1.4% lower for those who
regret. When wages are 1% lower after switching,
graduates take on average 0.3 months additional
training. Finally, we find some indication that
students who are uncertain about their educational
choice tend to more frequently choose fields of study
that provide skills that can more easily be transferred
to other fields.
Our model also has implications for the initial
study choices. A person who is unsure about his
initial choice will take the estimated skill transfer-
ability into account and strategically decide to choose
a more general field of education. If the discipline was
not what he expected, he will be able to switch to a
different discipline without sizable costs. If uncertain
persons are more likely to regret their education
afterwards, those who choose a broader discipline
should, on average, have a higher level of regret. We
tested the relation between the transferability para-
meters and the mean level of regret, which indeed is
significant and positive. Therefore, it can be predicted
that the average amount of regret would even be
higher if there were no general fields of study.
A second implication of the model is that people
who do not regret their initial education, are more
likely to switch if the transferability increases.
We find a positive relation between the average
level of switching and the transferability parameters
for those who do not regret their initial choice.
Robustness and extensions
Switching differently defined. In our analysis, we
measure a switch by monitoring the field of one’s
education or further education and, at the same time,
the relation between the original education and the
present job. We add the latter group because people
can switch without additional education by starting
to work in a job not related to their education and
acquiring the skills on the job. In this definition,
graduates who work outside their educational
domain do so voluntarily. An important point is
that graduates may instead also be unable to find a
job related to their education. They are then
Table 5. Correlation between transferability parameters
(SE in parenthesis)a
Coefficient R-squared
Model 1 (Dependent¼Switch
without regret)
0.525
Intercept 0.184*** (0.010)
Ds 0.073*** (0.001)
Model 2 (Dependent¼Switch
with regret)
0.325
Intercept 0.029** (0.011)
Ds 0.056*** (0.002)
Model 3 (Dependent¼Wage) 0.301
Intercept 0.265*** (0.004)
Duration of training 0.019*** (0.001)
Model 4 (Dependent¼Wage) 0.260
Intercept 0.332*** (0.003)
Switch without regret 0.174*** (0.006)
Model 5 (Dependent¼Wage) 0.272
Intercept 0.319*** (0.003)
Switch with regret 0.183*** (0.006)
Model 6 (Dependent¼Switch
without regret)
0.803
Intercept 0.038*** (0.005)
Switch with regret 0.922*** (0.009)
Notes: aThe estimates in this table show the relations
between the transferability parameters. All relations are
regressed separately by weighted least squares.
**¼ significant at 5%, ***¼ significant at 1%.
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involuntarily ‘mismatched’. Our finding that switch-
ers earn lower wages may therefore confound two
effects: one due to the loss of human capital, one due
to a mismatch penalty.
If we define switching as a continuation in a
different field of education only, we find that if wages
are 1% lower due to lower skill transferability, the
probability of a graduate regretting his choice
actually switching decreases by 1.5%-points, while
those who switch take on average 0.4 months
additional education. Comparing these estimates
with the original ones, we see that the differences
are small. This implies that either there are few
graduates who involuntarily have a job which does
not relate to their education or that these graduates
react similarly to stimuli as graduates who switch
education.
Do low-ability graduates switch more often? To some
it may appear that there are other reasons for
switching than a high level of regret or high
transferability. What if, for instance, graduates who
regret their choice are typically less intelligent than
those who do not regret their choice? If so, not regret
but intelligence would predict switching behaviour.
Assuming that intelligence can be measured by wages,
we checked (Table A4) if those who regret their
choice receive a lower wage than graduates who do
not regret their choice, both for switchers and
nonswitchers. We find that there is only a (signifi-
cantly negative) effect for nonswitchers
(coefficient¼0.063, p¼ 0.003). In other words,
graduates who do not switch but regret their choice
of education receive lower wages than those who do
not regret their choice. If intelligence were to be of
importance instead of regret, we would have to find
the same relationship also for switchers. The negative
relation that we find for nonswitchers is probably due
to our strict definition of a switch, being a change
from one field of study to another. It is, however,
possible that a graduate switches from one discipline
to another within a field of study. Then, we do not
measure a switch but the graduate loses human
capital because he switches.
VI. Conclusion
The choice of discipline has an enormous impact on
the satisfaction of later careers. However, students
who choose their education have very limited
information about what they like when they get
older and what the labour market perspectives of the
chosen profession are. Therefore, it is likely that some
of them will regret their choice of education. To
analyse the impact of regret on switching to another
profession, we developed a choice model where the
individual must decide after the initial education (i)
whether or not to change occupations after gradua-
tion and (ii) how much to invest in education, either
in his original discipline or in an alternative
discipline. The individual maximizes his utility
which depends both on wages and intrinsic motiva-
tion. From the model, it can be concluded that
besides regret, skill transferability is the key determi-
nant for his choices. If occupational mobility leads to
a large loss of human capital, so transferability is low,
the probability that the graduate will switch is low.
However, when graduates with a low skill transfer-
ability nevertheless decide to change occupations,
they will invest more in education. Using data about
Dutch graduates from the CHEERS survey, we have
tested our model. Consistent with our model we find
that, conditional on the level of regret, higher skill
transferability induces switching and reduces the
wage loss and the duration of the training followed
after the initial education.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Arnaud Dupuy, Ben
Kriechel, Edwin Leuven, Philip Marey, Derek Neal,
Hessel Oosterbeek, Gerard Pfann, Catherine Ris,
Wendy Smits, Maarten Vendrik, Bas Ter Weel,
seminar participants at the 2003 Human Capital
Workshop at Maastricht University, the 2003 EALE
conference in Seville and the 2003 Transitions in
Youth conference at Madeira, the editor and an
anonymous referee for valuable comments and
Christina Lo¨nnblad for editorial assistance.
References
Bell, D. (1982) Regret in decision making under uncer-
tainty, Operations Research, 30, 961–81.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967) The production of human capital
and the life-cycle of earnings, Journal of Political
Economy, 75, 352–65.
Bils, M. (1985) Real wages over the business cycle: evidence
from panel data, Journal of Political Economy, 93,
665–89.
Brunello, G. (2004) Labour market institutions and the
complementarity between education and training in
Europe, in Education, Training and Labour Market
Policies in Europe (Eds) D. Checchi and C. Lucifora,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, Macmillan, pp. 188–209.
Bu¨chel, F. and Mertens, A. (2004) Overeducation, under-
education and the theory of career mobility, Applied
Economics, 36, 803–16.
Skill transferability, regret and mobility 1673
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
aa
st
ric
ht
] A
t: 
10
:5
7 
25
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
Dolton, P. and Vignoles, A. (2000) The incidence and
effects of overeducation in the U.K. graduate labour
market, Economics of Education Review, 19, 179–98.
Fishburn, P. (1982) Nontransitive measurable utility,
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 26, 31–67.
Freeman, R. (1975) Legal cobwebs: a recursive model of the
market for new lawyers, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 57, 171–9.
Groot, W. (1996) The incidence of, and returns to
overeducation in the U.K., Applied Economics, 28,
1345–50.
Heckman, J. (2000) Policies to foster human capital,
Research in Economics, 54, 3–56.
Heijke, H., Meng, C. and Ris, C. (2003) Fitting to the job:
the role of generic and vocational competencies in
adjustment and performance, Labour Economics, 10,
215–29.
Hersch, J. (1991) Education match and job match, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 73, 140–4.
Jovanovic, B. (1979) Job matching and the theory of
turnover, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 972–90.
Loomes, G. and Sugden, R. (1982) Regret theory: an
alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty,
The Economic Journal, 92, 805–24.
McGuinness, S. (2003) Graduate overeducation as a
sheepskin effect: evidence from Northern Ireland,
Applied Economics, 35, 597–608.
McLaughlin, J. and Bils, M. (2001) Interindustry mobility
and the cyclical upgrading of labor, Journal of Labor
Economics, 19, 94–135.
Miller, R. (1984) Job matching and occupational choice,
Journal of Political Economy, 92, 1086–120.
Mu¨ller, W. and Shavit, Y. (1998) The institutional
embeddedness of the stratification process, a compara-
tive study of qualifications and occupations in thirteen
countries, in From School to Work (Eds) Y. Shavit and
W. Mu¨ller, Clanerdon press, NewYork, pp. 1–48.
Neal, D. (1998) The link between ability and specialization,
an explanation for observed correlations between
wages and mobility rates, Journal of Human
Resources, 33, 173–200.
Neal, D. (1999) The complexity of job mobility
among young men, Journal of Labor Economics, 17,
237–61.
Robst, J. (1994) Measurement error and the returns
to excess schooling, Applied Economics Letters, 1,
142–4.
Rosen, S. (1976) A theory of life earnings, Journal of
Political Economy, 84, S45–67.
Ryan, P. (2001) The school-to-work transition: a cross-
national perspective, Journal of Economic Literature,
39, 34–92.
Sauer, R. (1998) Job mobility and the market for lawyers,
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 147–71.
Shaw, K. (1984) A formulation of the earnings function
using the concept of occupational investment, Journal
of Human Resources, 19, 319–40.
Sicherman, N. and Galor, O. (1990) A theory of
career mobility, Journal of Political Economy, 98,
169–92.
Siow, A. (1984) Occupational choice under uncertainty,
Econometrica, 52, 631–45.
Sloane, P., Battu, H. and Seaman, P. (1999) Overeducation,
undereducation and the British labour market, Applied
Economics, 31, 1437–53.
Topel, R. and Ward, M. (1992) Job mobility and the
careers of young men, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107, 439–79.
Weiss, Y. (1971) Investment in graduate education,
American Economic Review, 61, 833–52.
Zarkin, G. (1985) Occupational choice: an
application to the market for public school teachers,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 409–46.
1674 L. Borghans and B. H. H. Golsteyn
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
aa
st
ric
ht
] A
t: 
10
:5
7 
25
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
00
8 
Appendix
Table A2. Distribution of switchers over disciplines from which they come and to which they switcha,b
Disciplines Percentage from Percentage towards
Teacher education and education science 10.2 0.0
Arts 3.2 2.5
Humanities 5.2 7.7
Social and behavioural science 8.6 11.7
Journalism and information 3.4 1.9
Business and administration 13.4 38.1
Law 6.4 5.2
Life science 0.4 1.1
Physical science 4.0 2.7
Mathematics and statistics 0.8 1.0
Computing 3.4 9.2
Engineering and engineering trades 12.2 5.0
Manufacturing and processing 0.0 0.0
Architecture and building 3.6 2.1
Agriculture and forestry 3.6 0.8
Veterinary 0.2 0.0
Health 4.8 5.7
Social services 8.4 2.3
Personal services 5.4 0.2
Transport services 1.4 1.5
Environmental protection 1.6 1.0
Total 100.0 100
Number of switchers 501 522
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
Notes: bSome people switch more than once. All fields to which they switch are reported. Therefore, the
amount of switchers in their original discipline is lower than the amount of switchers in the fields to which
they switch.
Table A1. Distribution of switching over gender and disciplines in original educationa
Disciplines (%) No switch (%) Switch
Male 69.1 30.9
Female 71.7 28.3
Teachers 70.6 29.4
Arts 73.1 26.9
Humanities 61.3 38.7
Social sc. 61.8 38.2
Journalism 68.6 31.4
Business 77.0 23.0
Law 69.6 30.4
Life sc. 53.8 46.2
Physical sc. 54.0 46.0
Mathematics 66.7 33.3
Computing 76.7 23.3
Engineering 58.3 41.7
Manufacturing 50.0 50.0
Architecture 68.1 31.9
Agriculture 65.4 34.6
Veterinary 81.8 18.2
Health 84.0 16.0
Social 72.8 27.2
Personal 61.7 38.3
Transport 55.0 45.0
Environmental 59.1 40.9
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
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Table A4. Results of wage, switch and duration equations (SE in parenthesis)
Variables Switch Ds Dns Wage
Intercept 6.243 (8.595) 77.529 (117.426) 22.269 (172.321) 5.833* (3.279)
Regret 0.393*** (0.064) 0.533 (0.611) 0.093 (0.875)
Regret * switch 0.028 (0.027)
Regret * no switch 0.063*** (0.021)
Male 0.127 (0.105) 0.356 (1.596) 0.196 (1.965) 0.075* (0.045)
Tenure 0.002** (0.001)
Age 0.379 (0.591) 3.751 (7.949) 3.809 (12.024) 0.518** (0.225)
Agesq 0.008 (0.010) 0.063 (0.134) 0.062 (0.207) 0.009** (0.004)
Teachers Ref. Ref. () Ref. () Ref.
Arts 7.737 (6.245) 8.760* (5.324) 0.312*** (0.115)
Humanities 6.340 (6.813) 1.809 (6.012) 0.069 (0.123)
Social sc. 1.742 (6.846) 2.856 (6.200) 0.245** (0.112)
Journalism 0.087 (9.514) 6.161 (8.074) 0.174 (0.155)
Business 8.614 (5.639) 11.862** (4.863) 0.255*** (0.081)
Law 0.046 (6.433) 6.539 (5.369) 0.362*** (0.123)
Physical sc. 2.374 (8.203) 1.597 (6.691) 0.221 (0.243)
Mathematics 13.909 (17.733) 9.376 (15.285) 0.638 (0.392)
Computing 0.174 (9.559) 7.178 (7.192) 0.448*** (0.160)
Engineering 0.439 (6.732) 7.922 (5.693) 0.264** (0.113)
Architecture 7.243 (8.363) 12.208* (6.838) 0.127 (0.139)
Agriculture 0.584 (10.001) 9.637 (8.050) 0.037 (0.140)
Health 5.653 (6.348) 10.311** (4.963) 0.281*** (0.087)
Social 2.042 (6.917) 8.568 (5.882) 0.076 (0.101)
Personal 5.095 (9.793) 4.435 (8.853) 0.220 (0.162)
Transport 5.418 (23.023) 8.568 (21.320) 0.018 (0.405)
Environment 1.539 (47.211) 0.561 (47.395) 0.478 (0.405)
Switch *Teachers 0.297** (0.140)
Switch *Arts 0.218 (0.288)
(continued)
Table A3. Distribution of regret over gender and disciplines in original educationa
Disciplines No regret Little regret Neutral Regret Strong regret
Male 27.2 39.3 16.6 12.6 4.3
Female 27.5 37.8 17.1 11.1 6.5
Teachers 27.0 37.4 18.3 10.0 7.3
Arts 33.7 40.4 6.7 13.5 5.8
Humanities 21.0 35.5 21.0 12.9 9.7
Social sc. 24.9 38.2 17.3 13.3 6.4
Journalism 18.6 37.1 18.6 18.6 7.1
Business 27.0 44.1 14.1 11.0 3.7
Law 32.6 37.8 16.3 10.4 3.0
Life sc. 38.5 30.8 15.4 7.7 7.7
Physical sc. 26.0 36.0 26.0 8.0 4.0
Mathematics 23.8 33.3 23.8 4.8 14.3
Computing 38.9 33.3 14.4 11.1 2.2
Engineering 27.5 37.5 18.3 12.9 3.8
Manufacturing 100
Architecture 24.2 42.9 17.6 12.1 3.3
Agriculture 30.9 33.3 19.8 11.1 4.9
Veterinary 36.4 36.4 18.2 9.1
Health 29.9 33.7 19.1 11.5 5.9
Social 26.7 39.0 16.9 11.3 6.2
Personal 20.2 41.5 14.9 12.8 10.6
Transport 25.0 25.0 25.0 20.0 5.0
Environmental 9.1 36.4 18.2 18.2 18.2
aSource: CHEERS, 1999.
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Table A4. Continued
Variables Switch Ds Dns Wage
Switch *Humanities 0.210 (0.189)
Switch * Social sc. 0.320* (0.167)
Switch * Journalism 0.384 (0.254)
Switch *Business 0.457*** (0.125)
Switch *Law 0.115 (0.208)
Switch *Physical sc. 0.0024 (0.320)
Switch *Mathematics 0.661 (0.515)
Switch *Computing 0.206 (0.275)
Switch *Engineering 0.292* (0.149)
Switch *Architecture 0.143 (0.251)
Switch *Agriculture 0.239 (0.227)
Switch *Health 0.425** (0.181)
Switch * Social 0.148 (0.183)
Switch *Personal 0.453* (0.236)
Switch *Transport 0.058 (0.658)
Switch *Environment 1.156* (0.512)
R0 *Arts 0.153 (0.328)
R0 *Humanities 0.288 (0.307)
R0 * Social sc. 0.584** (0.247)
R0 * Journalism 0.441 (0.387)
R0 *Business 0.405** (0.195)
R0 *Law 0.151 (0.278)
R0 *Physical sc. 0.774* (0.409)
R0 *Mathematics 0.045 (0.803)
R0 *Computing 0.253 (0.357)
R0 *Engineering 0.474** (0.229)
R0 *Architecture 0.056 (0.323)
R0 *Agriculture 0.214 (0.348)
R0 *Health 0.762*** (0.264)
R0 * Social 0.062 (0.258)
R0 *Personal 0.368 (0.314)
R0 *Transport 1.071 (0.781)
R0 *Environment 1.039 (0.691)
R1 *Arts 0.206 (0.440)
R1 *Humanities 0.486 (0.322)
R1 * Social sc. 0.129 (0.299)
R1 * Journalism 0.586 (0.457)
R1 *Business 0.375 (0.231)
R1 *Law 0.187 (0.364)
R1 *Physical sc. 0.535 (0.524)
R1 *Mathematics 0.080 (0.790)
R1 *Computing 0.457 (0.466)
R1 *Engineering 0.427 (0.276)
R1 *Architecture 0.086 (0.414)
R1 *Agriculture 0.134 (0.413)
R1 *Health 0.947*** (0.301)
R1 * Social 0.338 (0.304)
R1 *Personal 0.085 (0.363)
R1 *Transport 0.189 (0.884)
R1 *Environment 0.563 (0.766)
Notes: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Ds is the duration of education
(in months) when a graduate switches. Dns is the duration of education when a graduate remains in his own field,
wages are logarithms of the wage, R0 is no regret (1, 2) and R1 is regret (3, 4, 5).
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